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Abstract 
 
We examine financial constraints and forms of finance used for investment, by analysing survey 
data on 157 large privatised companies in Hungary and Poland for the period 1998 – 2000. The 
Bayesian analysis using Gibbs sampling is carried out to obtain inferences about the sample 
companies’ access to finance from a model for categorical outcome. By applying alternative 
measures of financial constraints we find that foreign companies, companies that are part of 
domestic industrial groups and enterprises with concentrated ownership are all less constrained 
in their access to finance. Moreover, we identify alternative modes of finance since different 
corporate control and past performance characteristics influence the sample firms’ choice of 
finance source. In particular, while being industry-specific, the access to domestic credit is 
positively associated with company size and past profitability. Industrial group members tend to 
favour bond issues as well as sells-offs of assets as appropriate types of finance for their 
investment programmes. Preferences for raising finance in the form of equity are associated with 
share concentration in a non-monotonic way, being most prevalent in those companies where the 
dominant owner holds 25%-49% of shares. Close links with a leading bank not only increase the 
possibility of bond issues but also appear to facilitate access to non-banking sources of funds, in 
particular, to finance supplied by industrial partners. Finally, reliance on state finance is less 
likely for the companies whose profiles resemble the case of unconstrained finance, namely, for 
companies with foreign partners, companies that are part of domestic industrial groups and 
companies with a strategic investor. Model implications also include that the use of state funds is 
less likely for Polish than for Hungarian companies. 
 
JEL classification: G32, P31, P34, F23, L33 
 
Key words: financial constraints, investment, enterprises, foreign ownership, industrial groups, 
concentrated ownership, leading bank, proportional-odds model, Bayesian updating. 
                                                           
♣ The survey was financed by the European Commission (Phare ACE Programme P98-1048-R) and the coding and 
preparation of the dataset by the MC Grabowski Fund. We express our gratitude to the sponsors. We also take 
exclusive responsibility for all the opinions expressed in this study. We are indebted to Igor Filatotchev and Piotr 
Kozarzewski who co-authored the questionnaire, to Piotr Kozarzewski and Peter Vince for their excellent work 
supervising the surveys and to Kate Bishop and Beata Monthey for their work on the preparation of database.   2
1. Introduction 
 
The measurement and determinants of financial constraints is a highly debated issue in the 
finance literature. The existence of financing constraints has implications for investment, 
financial system stability and economic development. Moreover, understanding factors shaping 
access to finance is of great importance for informing decisions supporting the process of 
market-oriented reforms. Financing constraints and access to finance generally refer to the notion 
of availability of external finance and hierarchy of finance, where “internally generated finance 
for investment is available at lower cost than external finance.” That \contrasts with the earlier 
neoclassical model of investment, “in which firms have access to unlimited sources of 
investment at an exogenously given cost” (Bond and Meghir, 1994, p.197).  
A large body of empirical evidence on the underlying multidimensional phenomenon relies on 
imperfect proxies, rendering inference vulnerable to alternative interpretations and criticism. The 
nature of studies describing and explaining financing constraints faced by the firms in the 
undergoing institutional change transition economies, where capital markets are underdeveloped 
and financial systems are ‘bank-oriented’, appears even more complex than that of investigations 
of financing options and budget constraints in firms in the high-income economies. Several 
arguments are advanced in the literature as explanations of the differences in financing 
structures. First, the transition economics literature notes a greater role of funds supplied by 
domestic industrial-financial groups and foreign direct investors for overcoming firms’ 
constraints in access to finance. Second, given nascent capital markets with thin trading in 
corporate securities and inadequate protection of minority shareholders under prevailing 
corporate governance structures and practices, ownership concentration can be offered as a 
partial explanation for financing constraints faced by transition firms. However, the direction of 
the impact of concentrated ownership on access to finance may vary. While company financiers 
may believe in gains of better monitoring provided by concentrated ownership, they are also 
likely to appreciate that such positive effects can be negated by the costs attributable to the 
agency problem resulting from concentrated equity holdings. The latter problem arises if for 
dominant equity holders, the entrenchment effects outweigh the incentive effects (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).
1 Third, in transition economies, government sponsored finance tends to play a 
                                                           
1 In addition, the finance literature stresses that in closely held firms, adequate monitoring by lenders is difficult and 
costly because the information asymmetries result in the agency problem of equity. When a company with limited   3
role in relaxing financial constraints for some companies, with the effect not necessary being 
efficiency enhancing. 
 
Our reading of the literature suggests that the issue of understanding financing constraints, 
especially in the context of transition economies, is calling for new operational measurements of 
the multidimensional concept and for more sophisticated empirical design employing survey 
instruments. In this study we contribute to the literature by constructing new indicators designed 
to exploit information on large industrial firms to identify the relative importance of firm-level 
and industry-level factors on access to and choice of financing sources over a recent period in a 
survey sample. We find that the presence of financing constraints is associated with the degree of 
ownership concentration. It also depends on ownership structures and is modified by ties with a 
leading bank. Moreover, by examining various types of financing, we show that avenues for 
overcoming financial constraints are determined by the foreign investor’ interest in the firm. 
Specifically, the range of finance sources accessible to domestic companies differs from that 
available to firms with foreign ownership. The results also suggest that access to finance is 
influenced by company size and industry sector. We conduct an analysis of the survey data on 
large privatised industrial firms by using the Bayesian approach, which allows a more natural 
interpretation of parameter credible intervals and provides finite sample inference on the 
determinants of access to finance. Section 2 of this paper discusses the rationale for the choice of 
Hungary and Poland. Section 3 reviews the theoretical literature and some empirical results on 
financing constraints and addresses the relationship between firm- and industry-level factors and 
availability of external finance. Section 4 deals with design of the interview survey and the 
sample. Section 5 discusses the methodology for data analysis, while results are reported in 
Section 6. Section 7 concludes.    
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
liability becomes financially distressed, equity takes on ‘call option’ characteristics (Black and Scholes (1973), 
Merton (1974)) and most downside costs will be born by creditors. That might provide an incentive and opportunity 
for the owners to misrepresent investment risks and returns and to take riskier actions than they would be willing to 
take in the absence of limited liability.    4
2. Why Hungary and Poland? 
 
One particular problem related to financial constraints is that their economic implications may be 
very different, as they are affected by the nature of the financial environment. Relaxing financial 
constraints is beneficial only when the resulting allocation of funds is efficient. In particular, in 
the case of ‘soft budget constraints’ (Kornai 1986, 2001), the outcome may have the negative 
implications for the stability of financial systems, and for the overall macroeconomic stability. 
This argument was accentuated in a seminal contribution by McKinnon (1993), who argues that 
in the early phase of transition (liberalisation), i.e. before the financial systems consolidate, it is 
beneficial to impose hard financial constrains on industrial companies, restricting their access to 
external finance. This may be the only feasible second-best solution, as the financial sector 
stability remains a priority.
2 Moreover, empirical evidence on economic growth in transition 
indicates that in the early phase, large productivity gains were available without high levels of 
investment, as documented by available empirical estimates of the growth functions.
3 
These considerations have important implications for our choice of the sample. Firstly, we wish 
to focus on the countries and periods of time, which represent a sufficiently advanced stage of 
reforms and restructuring processes when investment becomes again a critical factor in 
restructuring and productivity enhancement. That justifies our choice of Hungary and Poland and 
our specification of mid 2001 as the relevant time period for conducting a questionnaire-based 
survey. All existing evidence points out that at the beginning of the new millennium, these two 
countries no longer suffered from soft budget constraint problems widespread in some other 
transition economies. Where the problems persist, these are mostly restricted to the residual 
state-owned sector in branches such as mining and heavy industry (Driffill and Mickiewicz, 
2003). As our sample frame is restricted to privatised companies, majority of the soft budget 
constraint cases is eliminated by default. 
The choice of Hungary and Poland is advantageous from another point of view. Both countries 
are characterised by variation in industrial structures and finance sources. Unlike in most 
transition economies, capital markets function relatively well. In particular, since the early 
                                                           
2 A dissenting view is implied by Calvo and Coricelli (1992). They argue that the excessive financial constraints 
played a critical role in the early ‘transitional recession’. See also Campos and Coricelli (2002) for more recent 
overview.   5
1990s, the Warsaw Stock Exchange was unique in the region as a viable source of new capital, 
while in other countries, the stock exchanges were only used for privatisation related floatations 
(Glaeser et al. 2001). Yet, in a more recent period, the performance of the Budapest Stock 
Exchange has not been different, or has even been better than that of the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange. 
The reverse logic applies to foreign direct investment. Hungary was a single transition country 
that became open to foreign direct investment very early, and by now records very high levels of 
foreign ownership in its enterprise sector. In this respect, Poland was initially lagging behind, 
and acceleration in inflow of foreign capital dates from mid 1990s. By now Poland has a 
significant foreign-owned industrial sector. 
Furthermore, in some countries, the privatisation process was completed with a dominant role 
played by one privatisation method. Examples of that situation are provided by mass 
privatisation programmes in Czech and Slovak republics, or mass privatisation with significant 
concessions to insiders in Russia. Yet in both Hungary and Poland, privatisation was completed 
by a variety of methods leading to diversified ownership and control structures.
4 That makes 
these two countries an ideal ground for testing hypotheses related to ownership and control 
structures. Moreover, as ownership structures and company types were strongly affected by 
recent policy choices of privatisation methods, they are less prone to the Demsetz-type critique 
(Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). That is, the period of time since the 
privatisation process was completed may be too short to establish some equilibrium on the 
corporate control markets, where inefficient types of ownership structures are eliminated, in 
which case one should not expect any systematic differences in performance between different 
types of firms. Indeed, corporate control markets in transition economies are far from this 
hypothetical equilibrium, as empirical studies demonstrate consistent differences in performance 
between various ownership types (see Djankov and Murell 2002 for an overview of empirical 
evidence). 
Summarising, our choice of the two countries is motivated by the fact that they are both 
characterised by diversity, not only in the available sources of finance, but also in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 See for instance Christofferson and Doyle (2000), Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2003). An overview is offered by 
Campos and Coricelli (2002). 
4 See Mickiewicz and Baltowski (2003) and Major (2003) for recent overviews of the Polish and Hungarian 
privatisation programmes, correspondingly.   6
ownership and corporate control structures. The latter characteristic is shared with some other 
transition economies and makes Hungarian and Polish companies a representative group of firms 
providing information necessary for exploring empirically differences in the enterprise behaviour 
related to investment financing.  
 
3. The theoretical setting and empirical evidence on the determinants of access to finance   
 
Financial constraints 
 
The nature of the link between financing constraints and investment is a highly debated issue in 
the literature on finance and investment. One strand of the literature shows that high sensitivity 
and positive response of investment to cash flow can be interpreted as evidence of financial 
constraints and demonstrates an empirical link with the likely predictors of credit constraints. In 
particular, some researchers clasify firms on the basis of dividend- payout behaviour (Fazzari et 
al, 1988), association with banks or business groups (Hoshi et al, 1991), ownership (Lizal and 
Svenjar 2002, among others) and firm size (see Schiantarelli 1996 and Hubbard 1998 for reviews 
of all but most recent literature). One seminal example of this approach is Bond and Meghir 
(1994), who develop a model incorporating the hierarchy of finance, relying on both dividend 
behaviour and issue of new shares. The investment behaviour of firms should differ across 
different financial regimes. Bond and Meghir (1994) argue that the following two types of 
companies may be identified as not being financially constrained:  
/i/ those, which pay dividends, which indicates that they can generate abundant internal funds in 
relation to perceived investment opportunities, and  
/ii/ the companies, which issue new stock to finance investment, i.e. have access to capital 
market finance.  
In between those two categories, one observes the third category of companies, which neither 
pay dividends nor finance new investment by issuing new shares. These companies are liquidity 
constrained in the sense that ‘a windfall addition to current earnings, which conveys no 
information about the firm’s future prospects, will result in an increase in investment’ (Ibid., 
p.203). This group of firm may be characterised by excess reliance on internal finance for 
investment.    7
However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997 and 2000) and Cleary (1999) present empirical evidence 
intended to demonstrate that the ‘investment-cash flow’ link is not a useful measure of financial 
constraints, due to non-monotonicities. While their conclusions were in turn questioned by 
Fazzari  et al. (2000), the debate has yielded inconclusive results. In particular, Kaplan and 
Zingales (2000) notice that some prominent companies, e.g., the likes of Microsoft, have high 
cash balances and avoid dividend payments, while investment remain very sensitive to changes 
in available cash flows. They notice that one explanation of this behaviour may relate to the so 
called ‘flypaper effect’, which is discussed by Hines and Thaler (1995). According to the latter 
authors, while “the distinction between having money on hand and being able to raise money 
without difficulty should have no impact on spending decisions”, in practice, “when it comes to 
predict the behaviour of governments, organisations and individuals, it is important to distinguish 
between the resources they have on hand and resources they could easily get” (Ibid., pp. 224-
225). Correspondingly, a larger volume of cash flow may lead to more investment. Consistent 
explanation of this type of behaviour is offered by an important strand of the literature originated 
by Jensen (1986), who proposed the “free cash flow” approach. According to this, managers 
maximise objectives, which are not in common with shareholders’ interests, with managers 
aiming to increase firm size, as this boosts their pay, status and power. Thus the cash flows that 
are at the disposal of managers after valuable/efficient investment is carried out, is “free cash 
flow”. Managers may then still take on more investment projects at the expense of shareholders, 
increasing firm size but at the cost of lower net present value. Consequently cash flow and 
investment may be positively related and this may explain the puzzling behaviour of firms like 
Microsoft. 
 
Corporate control structures 
 
If Jensen’s (1986) argument is correct, than the structures of corporate control should be 
considered when examining empirically investment financing. The investment behaviour may be 
affected because parameters of the objective function will vary and also because differences in 
corporate control structures impact on efficiency of aligning the objectives of insiders with those 
of providers of finance. Therefore, the characteristics of corporate control structures and identity 
of owners may correspond to the extent to which firms are hindered by information and incentive   8
problems in capital markets, and thus investment may have varying degrees of reliance on 
internal cash flows. 
 
One important dimension of corporate control is ownership structure and concentration, while a 
typical feature of Hungarian and Polish firms is highly concentrated ownership structures. That 
follows from the characteristics of nascent capital markets and also can be explained by the fact 
that protection of minority shareholders is still much less adequate than in countries such as the 
US or the UK. Yet the effect of concentrated ownership on access to finance may be ambiguous, 
as the providers of finance may perceive positive effects of better monitoring, but on the other 
hand may see the negative effects related to agency problems. The latter may arise, where, for 
concentrated owners, the entrenchment effects outweigh the incentive effects (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Empirical evidence documents that the resulting impact of concentrated 
ownership may be nonmonotonic (a classic study being Morck et al. 1988; for the overview of 
the issue in the transition economies context, see Filatotchev and Mickiewicz 2001). 
 
While characteristics both of firms and of institutional frameworks of capital markets differ 
across transition economies, different control structures may emerge as a second-best response to 
those conditions. One example of that relates to the degree of firms’ affiliation to wider industrial 
conglomerates. Hoshi et al. (1991) examine whether liquidity is a more relevant determinant of 
investment for the Japanese firms which are affiliated to a keiretsu or industrial group with close 
links to banks, then for those firms which are independent of these alliances. Their main result 
shows that the liquidity variable - cash flow
5, is more important for the independent firms, than 
for the firms affiliated to an industrial group and/or leading bank. Hall et al. (1998b) study the 
determinants of investment in scientific firms for the US, France and Japan (1979-89) and find 
that the links between investment, profit, sales and cash flow are idiosyncratic and country-
specific. In the US, investment is more sensitive to cash flow, as compared to France or Japan. 
The authors argue that this observation reflects differences in corporate governance structures, 
which appear country-specific. Firms in the US do not enjoy close links with banks while 
Japanese firms do, so the cost of external finance maybe higher, forcing firms to rely more on 
internal funds. Degrsye and de Jong (2000) also hypothesise that corporate governance will 
                                                           
5 Measured in their study by net (after tax) income plus depreciation, less dividend payments.   9
affect investment expenditure. While estimating investment equation, they interact a cash flow 
variable with the measures of corporate governance, such as board structure, ownership and bank 
relations. In their analysis they find that firm-bank relations and the size of the largest 
shareholder have no impact on investment. However, the size of insider equity increases the 
impact of cash flow upon investment. Galindo and Schiantarelli (2002) provide an overview of 
recent research on investment financing in Latin America, reporting evidence that firms with 
foreign ownership are less restricted in their access to finance. The result may not be general, as 
Colombo (2001) found no significant impact of foreign ownership on access to short-term debt 
finance for Hungary. More recently, Harrison and McMillan (2003) using a sample of firms 
taken from the Ivory Coast demonstrate that foreign companies are less credit constrained than 
domestic firms. Foreign ownership may be conductive to easier access to finance not just 
because of direct funding from foreign partners and greater availability of foreign sources of 
finance. Another reason may be that firms with some degree of foreign ownership enjoy less 
bankruptcy risk, as they adopt faster international standards on product quality and therefore find 
it easier to gain access to domestic bank debt (Colombo 2001; Harrison and McMillan 2003). 
 
Firm size 
 
Smaller companies may be constrained in their access to external finance (Keasey and Watson 
(1993), Jarvis (2000)). One possible explanation is that providers of finance incur fixed costs of 
evaluating the investment project. This condition alone will be sufficient to create a bias against 
smaller firms. Moreover, smaller firms tend to be subject to idiosyncratic risk, being less likely 
to have developed a good reputation with investors, as small firms are typically start-ups with no 
long credit history (Schiantarelli 1996; Colombo and Driffill 2003). However empirical evidence 
is mixed and again, the conclusions may be specific to particular countries or types of financial 
systems. Fazzari et al. (1988) investigate the link between firm size and access to capital and 
argue that in times of tight credit, small and medium-sized firms are often denied funds, in 
favour of better quality borrowers (p153). Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that there is a strong 
correlation between firm size and the scope for external financing: smaller firms rely on 
intermediary finance, while larger firms are not restricted in their access to capital market. Using 
firm-level data for US manufacturing companies, Bernanke et al. (1994) present strong empirical   10
evidence that the severity of the agency cost problem faced by firms depends on firm size. Lizar 
and Svejnar (2002) focus on enterprises in Czech Republic and in attempting to control for size, 
split their sample into sub-samples of large firms numbering 100 or more employees and of 
small firms with fewer that 100 employees. From this exercise they find evidence of credit 
rationing (i.e. a positive relationship between profit and investment) only for smaller, private 
firms. In contrast, larger firms in their sample have virtually unlimited access to capital implying 
a negative relationship between profit and investment for their data. However, contrasting results 
were obtained as well. For instance, Hu and Schiantarelli (1994) found that ceteris paribus, size 
is positively associated with the probability of the firm being financially constrained. Again, a 
possible explanation is that banks face a trade-off between higher evaluation and preparation 
costs for multiple small and medium size loans and higher risk resulting from a focus on smaller 
number of large projects.  
The literature also notes the agency problem of equity peculiar to closely held firms. As already 
mentioned, information asymmetries make adequate monitoring of smaller firms by lenders 
difficult, because when a company with limited liability becomes financially distressed, equity 
takes on ‘call option’ characteristics (Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974)). That might 
provide an incentive and opportunity for the owners/insiders to misrepresent investment risks 
and returns and to take more riskier actions than they would be willing to take in the absence of 
limited liability.  
To summarise, our reading of the literature is that, on balance, large firms should have lower 
agency costs per unit of external finance because of their greater diversification, longer track 
records, and because of economies of scale in collecting and processing information about their 
situation. This gives rise to the agency problem in credit markets for smaller firms who 
experience reduced access to credit relative to other borrowers. 
 
Conclusions derived from this section 
 
•  Firms, which pay dividends and/or can rely in their investment finance on external sources, 
may be considered as not being financially constrained.
6 
                                                           
6 A word of caution. Even if the conclusion is fairly standard, it needs a qualification. Namely, due to informational 
imperfections and the need for signalling, it might be that the firm ought to pay dividends even at the expense of 
foregoing a positive NPV investment opportunity.   11
•  The relation between concentration of ownership and access to finance may be ambiguous, as 
the providers of finance may perceive positive effects of better monitoring, but on the other 
hand also the negative effects related to agency problems.  
•  We expect that less financially constrained firms are those, which are affiliates of foreign 
companies, which have close links with wider industrial structures, which have a leading 
bank, are which are of larger size. 
•  A corollary of the previous conclusion: firms belonging to corporate alliances such as foreign 
affiliates, affiliates of domestic industrial conglomerates, and enterprises established close 
links with their leading bank can use a wider range of available external finance sources to 
complement internally generated cash flows for investment programmes.  
•  It is likely that in some industry sectors companies with no access to these alternative sources 
of finance tend to resort to state support. 
 
4. The survey sample 
 
Method of Collecting Survey Data   
 
In comparison with some other post-communist countries, especially the CIS countries, 
company accessibility for conducting a survey-based academic research in Poland and Hungary 
is relatively good, especially in the case of largest firms, which are generally more accustomed to 
openness than smaller enterprises. However, we note two problems. The first problem is the 
credibility of an investigator. Interview was the method of collection of information in our 
survey where opinions of chief executives regarding their firms’ access to finance were sought 
alongside factual information. For a survey involving interviews where the desired information is 
likely to be divulged reluctantly, the selection of trained, experienced and credible investigators 
is crucial for obtaining the required data on firms and measuring attitudes of chief executive 
officers. It was important to ensure that owners, managers and employees of a participating 
company, trusted interviewers with information collected strictly for the purpose of academic 
research. The companies contributed to the surveys have also been given assurances as to 
complete anonymity in any form of the output resulting from the data analysis. Our face-to-face 
questionnaire survey of Polish and Hungarian companies involving interviews with the   12
companies’ chief executive officers, was commissioned and conducted in mid 2001, respectively 
by the Research Department of the Polish Sociological Society (under supervision of the CASE 
Institute, Warsaw) and by the Hungarian Academy of Science. The Polish partners, CASE and 
the research department of the PSS, have extensive research experience in surveys at the 
company level. The Research Department of the Polish Sociological Society conducted the 
whole field phase of the survey study (training interviewer teams, collecting key company 
information, interviewing the firms’ managers) as well as prepared initial data for further 
analysis. The team has conducted dozens of national and regional polls in companies of various 
legal types, industry sectors and ownership types. It has a stable network of professional 
interviewers, which covers the whole country. They are well aware of the situation in their 
regions, have huge experience of work with companies - both state-owned and private - and 
employ a range of techniques necessary for gaining entry into a company and gaining confidence 
of its personnel. In addition to methodological background, they also possess good practical 
knowledge about intra-company personal relations. Another strength of the team employed for 
conducting our survey is a comprehensive system of control used by the investigators at every 
stage of their work. Extensive experience in conducting surveys ensures high quality of their 
work. Similar assessments can be given in relation to quality of the survey work undertaken by 
the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Science, a well-established economic 
research institute in Hungary with strong expertise in field surveys and data analysis. 
The second problem is “sensitivity” of owners and managers of a company towards the 
questions tapping the information regarded as “confidential” or non-permissible on the grounds 
of protecting the competitiveness of a company. The questionnaire items which were initially 
seemed as being likely to evoke an adverse reaction related to ownership and control structures 
including the distribution of insider share-holdings; number of shares in the company held by 
interviewees; interviewees’ positions in the company hierarchy; interviewees’participation in the 
Management Council and Supervisory Board, and interviewees’ affiliations. Most reports 
dealing with past experience on this type of survey questions suggests that up to 10-15% of 
interviewees may refuse to co-operate and provide answers, irrespective of interviewer skills. 
The non-response rate for our interview survey was in the similar ballpark and can be considered 
satisfactory, however, item-non-response gave rise to the issue of choosing the appropriate 
missing data treatments in a subsequent data analysis. Fewer difficulties were encountered by our   13
investigators in relation to the questionnaire part dealing with financial performance and position 
of firms since, in both countries, company reports are available to external parties and under the 
adopted regulations large firms disclose sufficiently detailed accounting information which can 
be considered reliable. 
In practice, item non-response due to confidentiality concerns did not occur, as care was 
taken to identify and eliminate possible sources of the problem at the time of questionnaire 
design and preliminary testing. However, given the time constraints of the interviewees, the 
missing answers arose due to the fact that some of the information was not readily available. 
That especially relates to the ownership dimension. 
 
Care was taken to obtain a sample representative of the population of large companies. 
We defined the sample frame using large company lists, which are maintained by the two 
reliable, published databases. For Poland, we employed the list of 500 largest (in terms of sales) 
non-financial companies compiled by a team of Polish economists at the Institute of Economics 
of the Polish Academy of Sciences and published by the „Rzeczpospolita”, a top broad-sheet 
newspaper published in Poland, which covers finance and business law. A smaller database of 
large companies is available for Hungary, which reflects the fact that Hungary has fewer large 
firms. The list of the 200 largest companies is published annually by the ‘Figyelo’ magazine. 
These two lists representing the two countries were pooled together, producing a sample frame 
that was used to select the firms for the survey at random. At the first stage of the Polish survey, 
84 questionnaires were completed,
7 and questionnaires on further 16 companies were obtained 
during the second stage after additional sampling. The survey of Hungarian companies generated 
57 usable questionnaires, yielding the total sample size of 157 firms. The survey results were 
additionally checked via re-sampling by using a sample of questions from the set of surveyed 
companies (10 companies for Poland, 5 companies for Hungary). No inconsistencies in answers 
were detected. 
 
The questionnaire
8 opens with the questions concerned with the key company 
characteristics, including sectoral affiliation, legal status, and date of privatisation (Section A). 
                                                           
7 Descriptive discussion of  the results from this part of the survey is provided by Kozarzewski (2002). 
8 The questionnaire is available on request from the authors.   14
Section B contains questions designed to measure a number of performance and financial 
position variables for three years prior to the survey (i.e. for 1998-2000). Section C deals with 
questions on finance. In section D we asked questions on employment, wage setting and 
industrial relations. Section E relates to internationalisation and market structures. Section F 
covers the areas of corporate governance and ownership structure. Points covered in this section 
of the questionnaire and in the sections dealing with finance and performance provide the 
information with which we investigate the issue of access to finance in this paper. 
 
A Description of the Sample and Coverage of the Questionnaire 
 
Definitions of variables and their descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 1-2. 95% of 
companies are drawn from the manufacturing sector, with 5% being in either services or 
construction. The cross-sector boundaries tend to be blurred as a trend towards changing 
affiliation from manufacturing to services is generally observed since the liberalisation / 
transition programme was introduced at the beginning of the 1990s. Some of the sample firms 
are active in both manufacturing and services (trade in particular). Median employment values 
are 596 for Poland and 542 for Hungary, but the distributions are skewed due to the presence of 
few very large companies, especially in the Hungarian sub-sample, where the largest company 
had 15599 employees at the end of 2000. For that reason the mean employment values are higher 
than the medians for both sub-samples, being 907 for Poland and 1403 for Hungary. 
Distributions of two alternative measures of size – assets and total revenues – follow a similar 
pattern, with the median values being higher for Poland than for Hungary, while the opposite is 
true for the means. Based on the full sample, in 2000, the median value of total revenues was 
US$37.7 million while the median value of total assets was US$26.4 million. The data on asset 
size should be interpreted with caution, as it represents book values. 
 
We grouped owners into three categories: foreign investors, domestic institutional investors and 
private individuals (the latter group including both insiders - managers and employees - and 
outsiders). From the corporate control perspective, there should be a significant difference in 
behaviour between insiders and outsiders, both because objectives may differ (esp. presence of 
wages and employment in the utility function) but also due to the possible entrenchment effects   15
on one side, and some productivity incentives on the other. Indeed, the difference is important 
when we compare de novo firms with privatised enterprises. It is the first group of de novo firms 
where individual private owners play an important governance role as entrepreneurs and 
founders of the firms, and typically retain important stakes in share ownership. Yet, the 
distinction between insider and outsider individual owners is far more blurred in the group of 
privatised companies from which our sample was drawn. The problem relates to the fact that in 
privatised companies, external individual owners are frequently either former employees or 
persons related to employees. For quoted firms, an important distinctive group is that of 
individual shareholders, who bought their shares on the stock exchange. Yet for this group it is 
difficult to identify the proportions of shares held respectively by employees and by outsiders. 
For that reason we employ an inevitably heterogeneus aggregate category of ‘individual owners’. 
The composition of ownership is best illustrated by distinguishing between the different types of 
the largest shareholder. Surprisingly, very similar distributions were found both for Hungary and 
for Poland, with differences between the two sub-samples being within a range of one percentage 
point. Thus, for the full sample, 46.3% of firms have foreign owners as the largest category of 
shareholders, 31.4% domestic institutional investors and 22.3% individual shareholders. In 
addition to the question about the largest shareholder category, we asked about the presence of a 
foreign partner as an investor, as this may be important regardless of the shareholding 
composition. Here, the differences between the two sub-samples are more pronounced, as 68.4% 
of Hungarian firms declare a presence of a foreign partner as compared with 59.0% for the 
Polish sub-sample. The category “the dominant owner being a foreign investor” is a subgroup 
within “the presence of foreign partner” category. In model specifications presented in Section 6 
we take the presence of foreign partner as our choice variable. As will be explored, this variable 
has a significant impact on financing patterns. 
The second corporate control dimension we take account for in modelling relates to 
concentration of shares, irrespective of ownership category. Respondents were asked about the 
proportion of shares held by the largest owner. It turned out that in our survey sample of largest 
companies, the level of share-ownership concentration was high. In Hungary, the dominant 
owner controlled on average 69.8% of shares and for Polish firms the corresponding figure was 
58.8%.   16
We constructed two measures of financial performance and position, which are presented in 
Table 1. The first variable measures profitability as the ratio of earnings before taxes (but after 
financing expenses) to total revenues. Profitability distributions are skewed due to a small 
number of companies reporting high profitability. In particular, in 1988-2000, Hungarian 
companies reported higher profits than Polish firms, with median values being correspondingly 
1.51% and 0.26%. A significant number of large Polish companies reported losses in 2000. The 
second financial variable is a measure of overall indebtedness. As no balance sheet data allowing 
to separate out long- and short-term debt obligations was available, we use a rather crude proxy 
represented by the ratio of total liabilities over total assets, with both components of the ratio 
being recorded at book values. While median values for both sub-samples are very similar, the 
mean values aren’t, as the mean value for Hungarian firms is much smaller than the median 
value due to the presence of several firms with relatively small levels of debt. The median value 
for the whole sample is 56.1% (57.4% for Hungary and 54.7% for Poland). 
We were also interested in two other dimensions of company behaviour connected with 
financing decisions of firms. Following the literature, dividend payments may indicate a category 
of firms, which were not financially constrained. In this respect, large Hungarian companies 
behave differently from large Polish large firms, specifically, 68.0% of Hungarian companies 
paid dividends in 2000, while only 18.9% of Polish firms made dividend payments in this year.  
Last but not least, our main focus is on investigating investment financing and measuring 
financing constraints. Our proposed first (‘direct’) measure of financial constraint is based on the 
answers to the following two questions: 
 
11. What is the company's estimate of the total cost of the modernisation investment over the next five years), 
required to achieve the strategic targets? 
          
 
12. What you expect to be a realistic level of modernisation investment over the next five years? 
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Essentially, Question 11 asked about the desired level of investment funds and Question 12 
about the expected realistic (obtainable) level of finance for investment. We interpret the 
cases where the latter is lower than the former as an indicator of constraints in investment. 
Interestingly, using this measure we may find that majority of companies in both countries 
were constrained in possibility of implementing their investment projects, while percentages 
are similar, 60.5% for Hungary and 54.9% for Poland. 
 
The questionnaire went on to ask Question 13, a close-ended question on the opinions of the 
firms’ chief executives regarding availability (accessibility in the future) of various sources 
of financing for their investment programmes. A common 7-point scale was used to describe 
managers’ assessment of nine forms of finance (this fragment of the questionnaire is shown 
below). Answers to this question enable us to create ordinal variables reflecting the 
importance of major forms of finance and to construct an additional binary indicator of 
financial constraints to supplement the ‘direct’ measure of constraints defined above. 
 
13. If you intend to raise all/some of the above sum of finance, what are the likely most important sources (score 
each factor as follows: 1 = low importance, 7 = high importance): 
 
Selling/leasing your buildings and 
equipment     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Selling shareholding in other companies 
        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Retained  earnings  (profits)    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Credits  from  local  banks    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Credits  from  foreign  banks  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Credits  from  industrial  partners  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
State  financial  support    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Issue  of  equity        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Issue  of  bonds      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Interestingly, the overall pattern of relative importance of finance sources for the sample   
companies in both countries turned out to be very similar, retained earnings followed by credit   18
from domestic banks were ranked as the two most important sources of finance for investment
9. 
For both sub-samples, those are the only two categories, where median values are different from 
1 (where 1 represents ‘not important’). Looking at the mean values, we can also see the ranking 
of other alternative sources of finance. Again, these are very similar for both countries, with only 
two cases, where some sources of finance swap places respectively. For both countries the third 
most important source of finance is sell-off of assets, which indicates that privatised companies 
are actively seeking to restructure and overcome the legacy of asset composition inherited from 
the previous period. Next comes credit from foreign banks and state support for investment, 
presumably under industry branch restructuring programmes. A somewhat less important role is 
played by equity issues and financial restructuring via sell-off of shareholdings in other 
companies. The two least important sources of finance are issue of corporate bonds and direct 
finance from industrial partners. 
As expected, retained earnings appear to be a most important source of financing for investment. 
Following the literature discussed above, we interpret the reliance on retained earnings as a 
second (‘indirect’) indicator of constrained finance. 
And finally, as mentioned above we also combine information from the answers to the questions 
on financing modes to construct our third (‘indirect’) measure of financial constraints. We define 
firms as being financially constrained if both of the following two conditions are satisfied. First, 
the scores in the internal categories of finance (retained earnings, sell-offs of assets and 
shareholdings) and/or state support should be greater than the ratings the firm’s chief executive 
assigned to the forms of external financing (the remaining five categories of finance, as 
enumerated above). The second condition is non-payment (omission) of dividends in 2000. 
 
In sum, we employ in modelling three measures of financing constraints on investment.  
Firstly, we use a ‘direct’ measure, based on expectations of chief executives related to possibility 
of implementing desired investment programme in full. 
Secondly, we use the importance of retained earnings for overall finance. 
                                                           
9 This finding seems consistent with the pecking order theory of capital structure (see, e.g., Myers, 1984).    19
Thirdly, we use a composite measure, where constrained firms are defined as those for whom 
internal sources of finance dominate external financing, and they do not pay dividends. The last 
two indicators may be labelled ‘indirect measures. 
 
5. The Statistical model 
 
Categorical Response Types 
 
The data set created with responses to closed-ended survey questions, makes it possible to 
investigate perceptions of chief executive officers of large privatised Hungarian and Polish 
industrial companies, towards a range of finance sources likely to be available for modernisation 
programmes planned by their firms. We analyse the role of funds, which can be generated 
internally, by investigating separately retained profits and finance that can be raised by selling 
stakes in other firms and by selling or leasing buildings and equipment to other enterprises. In 
addition we consider the potential relevance to modernisation programmes of sources providing 
companies with new long- and short-term finance obtained via issues of equity and corporate 
bonds, borrowings from domestic and foreign banks, support from the state, and credit from 
industrial partners. The survey information also represents managers’ judgements both about the 
level of capital expenditure desired and necessary to achieve the firm’s strategic objectives and 
about the realistic estimates of internal and external finance potentially available to the firm. This 
particular dimension of the questionnaire survey enables us to propose and construct the direct 
measure of financing constraints likely to be experienced by the firms in implementing their 
desirable investment programmes.  
 
It is important to note at this juncture that responses to the survey allow us to construct ordinal 
categorical and binary response variables for regression modelling of access to finance. 
Specifically, we utilise ‘assessed’ or ‘judged’
10 ordinal 7-level
11 categorical variables generated 
by managers who possess an indeterminate amount of information before providing their 
judgements regarding the importance of a particular finance source, and binary indicators created 
                                                           
10 See Anderson (1984) for a relevant discussion of the major types of observed ordinal categorical variables.  
11 As discussed above, managers were asked to indicate how important a source will be for financing modernization, on a 7-point 
rating scale with end-points labelled low importance (1) and high importance (7).      20
with the survey information to capture the presence/absence of financing constraints. For both 
types of categorical responses we use parametric analysis based on the family of logistic 
distributions. In this study we employ separate regression models linking a response variable, y, 
with a set of predictor or explanatory variables x, underlying managers’ opinions and associated 
with a possibility of financial constraints. The set of predictor variables includes firm-level 
characteristics that reflect asset size, profitability, indebtedness, ownership structure and 
concentration as well as controls for activity sector and economy-wide differences.   
Bayesian Inference and the Proportional Odds Model for Ordinal Response 
 
In this study, inference summarising opinions of chief executive officers is done using the 
Bayesian approach for analysing the interview survey data. A fundamental strength of Bayesian 
modelling is that posterior parameter estimates are assumed to have a distribution and therefore 
give more realistic picture of uncertainty. Other natural advantages over classical inference 
include: (i) avoiding the assumption of infinite amounts of forthcoming data; (ii) the potential for 
handling missing values as part of the estimation process; (iii) a direct interpretation of posterior 
credible intervals for model parameters and (iv) finite sample results (Congdon (2003), Gill 
(2002)). The Bayesian approach is based on updating previous knowledge about the distribution 
of some unknown quantity. In classical inference, the sample data are taken as random while 
population parameters are taken as fixed, while Bayesians make no fundamental distinction 
between the sample data, missing values and unknown model parameters, both these quantities 
are treated as random variables as a logical consequence of Bayesian conditional analysis. In 
Bayesian analysis, model parameters θ follow a probability distribution, knowledge of which is 
summarised in a prior distribution π(θ).  The likelihood of the observed data y given parameters 
θ, denoted L(θ|y) , is used to modify the prior beliefs π(θ), with the update knowledge 
summarised in a posterior distribution, π(θ|y)  (for details see, e.g., Congdon (2003)). The 
updated beliefs are a function of prior knowledge and the sample data evidence:  
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An important feature of this model, which backs up its use for our analysis of survey data on 
Hungarian and Polish companies, is that in the Bayesian context, missing values are treated as 
another set of unknown quantities. As discussed in Section 4, our survey data contain missing 
values resulting from the failure to obtain answers to some individual items, however we should 
note that the incomplete data problem is not acute with average item non-response rates in order 
of 10-15%. Simply omitting companies with missing values from the analysis leads to valid 
inferences only if data are missing completely at random, that is the missing data values are a 
simple random sample of all data values. A less restrictive assumption, employed for our models, 
is that of missingness at random under which the probability that an observation is missing 
depends on the observed data but not on missing data. The data are missing at random if the 
missingness on one question is conditionally independent of the outcome on that question that 
would have been observed, given the observed responses to other questions (Congdon (2003)). 
The treatment of missing values involves the definition of what the data should be expected to 
look like given a specific probabilistic function conditional on unknown variable values. In 
generating samples from the posterior distribution we apply Gibbs sampling, a Markov chain 
Monte Carlo method (Gilks, Richardson, Spiegelhalter (1996)). Posterior distributions are 
summarised in terms of means and credible intervals for regression coefficients of independent 
variables. 
   
For modelling a multilevel ordinal outcome, we assume the proportional odds model with a 
latent (continuous) variable y underlying the ordered categories (discussions of the model can be 
found in McCullagh (1980), Anderson (1994), Agresti (1996), Congdon (2003)). 
 
Suppose the states are ranked from 1 (least important) to J (most important), with cutpoints θj  
from the continuous scale describing the transition from one category to the next.  
 
If J (the number of levels) is equal to 7 (and this is the case with the observed in the survey 
ordinal responses), there are 6 cut points. It is usually assumed that there are additional start and 
end points to the underlying scale  
 
0 θ and 7 θ such as  +∞ = −∞ = 7 0 ,θ θ        (2) 
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Then θj (j=1,…,6) are free ancillary parameters to estimate, subject to the constraint 
 
 
The probability Pij that the chief executive officer of an individual firm i will articulate the 
importance of the source of finance as j is then the same as the chance that the firm’s underlying 
score is between θj-1 , θj 
 
The cumulative probability γij that firm i with latent score Yi will rank the importance of the 
source of finance as j or below is  
 
 
We can write the chance of managers articulating a specific category as j  
 
 
The proportional-odds model uses the logit as a link function for γij  
 
 
 
Note that model (6) assumes parallel/identical effects of covariates for all J-1 collapsings of the 
response into the binary outcome. Hence β does not have a subscript. In model (6), the negative 
sign on µi ensures that larger values of β′x lead to an increased chance of belonging to the higher 
category. 
 
We fit nine separate univariate proportional-odds models. The dependent ordinal variables 
measure importance of: (1) retained profits, finance that can be raised by (2) selling investments 
in other firms, funds generated by (3) selling  or  leasing buildings and equipment to other 
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enterprises, (4) equity and (5) bond finance, (6) borrowings from domestic and (7) foreign banks, 
(8) support from the state, and (9) credit from industrial partners
12.  
 
In addition, we fit a standard logistic regression for the two binary indicators
13 of financial 
constraints in terms of observed predictors x: 
 
 
In our study of finance sources accessible to a large privatised firm in a transition economy, 
previous substantive knowledge about model parameter distributions is not summarised and may 
be assumed non-existent. Therefore to reflect prior ignorance we resort to the strategy of non-
informative priors.  
In all the models presented in Section 6, β and α are assigned vague normal priors with zero 
means and large variances for letting the survey sample data to dominate the form of the 
posterior distributions.  
 
 
6. Results 
 
The output of the Gibbs sampler is presented in Tables 3a-3c below. The posterior distributions 
of regression coefficients are summarised in terms of their means and 95% Bayes credible 
intervals. In each of the models shown in Tables 3a-3c, inference is based on the last 5,000 Gibbs 
samples with a 5,000 burn-in.       
 
When we take financing from retained earnings as an ordinal indicator of financial constrains 
(FINRET in Table 3b), a clear pattern emerges. Ranked in order of magnitude, we have the 
following four effects.  
                                                           
12 The description of the nine ordinal indicators FINRET, FINSHR, FINSALE, FINEQ, FINBOND, FINCRED, 
FINFOR, FINSTRAT and FININD can be seen in Table 1. 
13 The description of the two binary indicators UNC_FIN and UN_FI_IN can be found in Table 1. 
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Firstly, concentrated ownership is likely to result in better access to finance. As the concentration 
variable distribution was highly non-normal, we discretise this variable and use four categories, 
taking 25%, 50% and 75% as cut-off points and using the lowest category (dispersed ownership) 
as the baseline (reference) category. The mean effects of the two highest categories are 
negatively signed, with two of them being significant. Dispersed ownership is clearly associated 
with reliance on retained earnings, which suggests that from the financing point of view, benefits 
from concentrated ownership control clearly out-weight the costs associated with potential 
agency problem. 
Secondly, having domestic institutional investor as a major shareholder helps to overcome 
financial constraints.  
Thirdly, firms with foreign partners are also characterised by lower financial constraints. 
And finally, Polish firms seem to be relying less on retained earnings than their Hungarian 
counterparts. 
We note that past profitability enters model with a positive sign, however, the credible interval 
contains zero. One possible explanation for this finding is that past profitability impacts upon 
availability of this mode of finance in two different ways. On the one hand, higher profitability 
may lead to accumulation of retained earnings (assuming that they are not distributed to 
shareholders), but on the other hand, good profitability records should facilitate the firm’s access 
to the alternative external modes of finance. 
 
The results for our second measure of financial constraint, a binary indicator, (UN_FI_IN in 
Table 3c) are consistent with the first one, albeit less pronounced. Note that in interpreting the 
direction of the effect, the positive signs correspond to negative signs on the previous measure, 
FINRET. This is because we define this second variable as (indirect) measure of unconstrained 
finance, a situation, where external sources of finance are more important than internal and/or 
dividend payments are positive. All the three corporate control variables have expected sign, 
being consistent with the coefficient sign pattern observed for the previous variable, although 
this time the only significant indicator of the absence of financial constraints is dominant 
ownership of domestic institutional investors. 
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In contrast, modelling unconstrained financing with our third measure, which is represented as a 
binary dependent variable recording that the level of expected obtainable investment is not lower 
than the expected level of desired investment (UNC_FIN in Table 3c) is dominated by two 
dimensions: sectoral controls and past profitability. Firms in heavy industry (the baseline 
(reference) category for sectoral controls) are more likely to be unable to implement their 
investment programmes, as one would expect. Furthermore, higher levels of past profitability 
result in lower constraints in investment, again as could be expected. For this measure, the 
corporate control variables are all insignificant. 
 
Our results on the three measures of unconstrained finance are further corroborated by results 
from proportional odds models for alternative modes of finance. This enables us to see the 
alternative channels of financing, where different structures of corporate control and different 
firm characteristics determine different ways of overcoming financial constraints. We restrict 
ourselves only to those relationships, which turned out to be statistically significant (Tables 3a – 
3c). 
Firstly, it is clear that institutional domestic investors have some owner-specific advantage in 
using internal restructuring as a strategy for financing new investment. Companies, which have 
institutional domestic investors as dominant owners, are most likely to rely in their financing 
strategies on sell-offs both of assets and of stakes in other companies (FINSALE and FINSHR). 
Another effect we register for this category of dominant owners is that they may in the future 
rely more heavily on bond issues (FINBOND). 
Secondly, the financing strategy of companies with foreign partners is clearly different. Along 
the financing dimensions represented in the specifications, the mean effects are better defined in 
the models where the coefficient for the variable capturing the presence of a foreign partner is 
negatively signed. Clearly, companies with foreign partners seem unlikely to rely on issue of 
bonds (FINBOND) and equity (FINEQ), albeit this second effect is insignificant. That is 
consistent with a popular belief that domestic capital markets are less important for foreign 
affiliates. Also, companies with foreign involvement are unlikely to rely on government-
sponsored finance (FINSTRAT). Finally, in a sharp contrast to the firms with the prevalence of 
domestic institutional owners, privatised companies with foreign involvement are unlikely to rely 
on sell-offs on assets (FINSALE) in their financing strategies.   26
Thirdly, we found two effects for the firms with concentrated ownership. Interestingly, there 
seems to be a non-monotonic effect in relation to investment financing by equity issues 
(FINEQ). This financing option is most probable for companies where 25%-49% of shares are 
held by the dominant owner. It seems that companies with most dispersed ownership may not be 
perceived as attractive by the capital market, and that affects negatively their access to equity 
finance. At the other end of the spectrum, companies with high levels of concentrated ownership 
may not need to use the capital market. Yet, in the case of the largest companies, the mode of 
finance may differ according to the identity of the dominant owners and is better captured by the 
relevant variables defined above [REWORD]. 
 
We also found some additional miscellaneous significant effects worth mentioning.  
 
While links with a leading bank turned out to be insignificant for our measures of unconstrained 
finance, this characteristic is a significant determinant of specific financing sources. 
Interestingly, it is positively associated with financing supplied by industrial partners (FININD). 
It indicates that the existing in the two countries industrial groupings are indeed of industrial and 
financial nature and the two network elements may have strong complementarity. In addition, as 
could be expected, links with a leading bank seem to facilitate raising investment finance by 
issuing corporate bonds (FINBOND). Generally, one can speculate, that the presence of a 
leading bank may have a beneficial signalling effect for other providers of finance, while the 
bank may perform some monitoring functions, alleviating basic agency problems. 
 
High levels of past profitability turn out to be a significant predictor in two cases. First, it is 
negatively associated with sell-offs both of assets and of shareholdings as a financing strategy 
(FINSALE and FINSHR). It suggests that both financing policies are triggered more by ‘push’ 
factors than by ‘pull’ factors. This is corroborated by the result for domestic credit (FINCRED), 
which for all the companies tend to be the most important, alternative to retained earnings source 
of finance (Tables 2a and 2b). And in the case of domestic credit, firms with high levels of past 
profits clearly enjoy most easy access (Table 3a). 
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Interestingly, our results suggest a strong firm size effect on the possible availability of domestic 
credit. Within a sample range, a non-linear component with a positive sign dominates over a 
linear one with a negative sign. Thus, we may conclude, that the size of the firm has a positive, 
albeit non-linear effect on access to credit, much in line with the existing literature. 
 
The ratio of debt to total assets employed here is significant for two types of external finance. 
Firms with high level of debt financing tend to seek new finance from industrial partners 
(FININD), which may suggest that the ‘push’ rather then ‘pull’ effect is operating here. 
Similarly, they are more likely to seek finance from foreign banks (FINFOR), which may 
suggest a pecking order, where firms with lower levels of indebtedness believe that they will 
utilise sources of domestic credit first. 
 
Sectoral differences, represented by control dummies, matter in some cases. Firms in heavy 
industry are most constrained when the degree of financing constraints is judged by the ratio of 
expected to desired investment spending. Most effects of other industry sectors are less certain, 
as posterior distributions include zero. One interesting exception is ITECH (firms in high and 
middle technology sectors). Here, reliance on retained earning is less likely, which may be 
consistent with intuitive explanations. As those sectors are expected both to expand and 
innovate; we may predict the retained earnings to be an insufficient source of founding, and this 
is consistent with the estimated effects. Another significant effect relates to sectoral ranking in 
use of domestic credit. Here, the coefficient for high/middle technology sector is lowest 
(negative), which is again consistent with less reliance on fixed claims founding in the high 
growth / high innovation sector. While coefficient for this sector is insignificant in this case, it 
can be compared with other sectors, where it is positive and significant. In particular, reliance on 
bank credit is most typical for the service sector firms. 
  
Finally, we found differences between Polish and Hungarian companies significant in some 
cases. Polish companies are more likely to rely on finance from industrial partners in their 
investment programmes (FININD). They are also more likely to rely on sell-offs of assets 
(FINSALE) and similarly on selling their stakes in other firms (FINSHR, albeit this latter effect   28
is insignificant). On the other hand, they are less likely to expect government-sponsored finance 
(FINSTRAT) for their investment programmes. 
 
Conclusions 
We believe that the three measures of financial constraints applied in this empirical investigation 
produced meaningful results. Estimations for the two ‘indirect’ measures reveal effects and 
relationships which are consistent with the stylised facts about finance in the countries, where 
financial systems are not yet fully developed, and enrich these stylised facts by adding a few 
additional details related to the impact of corporate control dimensions. We find that the foreign 
companies, firms that are part of domestic industrial groups and enterprises with concentrated 
ownership are all less constrained in their access to finance. Interestingly, modeling results for 
the third, ‘direct’ measure of constraints in investment suggest the dominant role of sectoral 
differences. In particular, it is clear that firms in heavy industry may encounter particular 
difficulties in their access to finance. This may not necessary imply an inefficient outcome, as 
the capital market valuation of investment projects may differ from assessments coming from the 
chief executives and the former may simply be more realistic. As the heavy industry 
sector is typically more prone to soft budget constraint (Driffill and Mickiewicz 2003), signs of 
restrictions in investment finance may not be a bad outcome. 
 
Aside from that, application of survey instruments enabled us to identify alternative modes of 
finance, as both different corporate control structures and past performance records influence the 
sample firms' choice of finance source. In particular, access to domestic credit is positively 
associated with company size and past profitability. Industrial group members tend to favour 
bond issues as well as sells-offs of assets as appropriate types of finance for their investment 
programmes. Preferences for raising finance in the form of equity are associated with share 
concentration in a non-monotonic way, being most prevalent in those companies where the 
dominant owner holds 25%-49% of shares. Close links with a leading bank not only increase the 
possibility of bond issues but also appear to facilitate access to non-banking sources of funds, in 
particular, to finance supplied by industrial partners. Finally, reliance on state finance is less 
likely for the companies whose profiles resemble the case of unconstrained finance, namely, for 
companies with foreign partners, companies that are part of domestic industrial groups and   29
companies with a strategic investor. Model implications also include that the use of state funds is 
less likely for Polish than for Hungarian companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   30
References 
 
Anderson, J.A. (1984) Regression and Ordered Categorical Variables. Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society. Series B, 46 (1), 1-30. 
Agresti, A., 1996. An Introduction to Categorical Data Analysis, New York: Wiley. 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., and Gilchrist, S., 1994, “The Financial Accelerator and the 
Flight to Quality”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 4789. 
Bond, S., and Meghir, C., 1994, “Dynamic investment models and the firm’s financial 
policy,” The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 61, 2, pp197-222. 
Black, F. and Scholes, M., 1973, “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities”, 
Journal of Political Economy, 81 (May-June), 637—59. 
Calvo, G. and F. Coricelli, “Stagflating Effects of the Stabilisation Programmes in 
Reforming Socialist Countries; Enterprise-side and Household-side Factors, The World Bank 
Economic Review, 6, 1, 71-90. 
Campos, N. and F. Coricelli, 2002, “Growth in Transition; What We Know, What We 
Don’t and What We Should”, Journal of Economic Literature, 40, 3. 
Christofersen, P. and P. Doyle, 2000, “From Inflation to Growth: Eight Years of 
Transition”, Economics of Transition, 8, 421-451. 
Cleary, S., 1999, “The relationship between firm investment and financial status,” The 
Journal of Finance, pp673-692. 
Colombo, E., 2001, “Determinants of corporate capital structure: evidence from 
Hungarian firms,” Applied Economics, 33, pp1689-1701. 
Colombo, E. and Driffill, J., 2003, “Financial Markets and Transition”, In:  Colombo, E., 
and Driffill, J., Eds. The Role of Financial Markets in the Transition Process, Heidelberg: 
Physica-Verlag, 1-12. 
Congdon, P. (2003) Applied Bayesian Modelling. John Wiley & Sons. 
Degryse, H., and de Jong, A., 2000, “Investment spending in the Netherlands: the impact 
of liquidity and corporate governance,” Catholic University of Leuven and University of Tilburg, 
mimeo. 
Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K., 1985, “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences”, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177. 
Demsetz, H. and Villalonga, B., 2001, “Ownership Structure and Corporate 
Performance”, Journal of Corporate Finance, 7, 209-233. 
Djankov, S. and P. Murell, (2002), “Enterprise Restructuring: A Quantitative Survey”, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 40, 3. 
Driffill, J. and T. Mickiewicz, 2003, “The Order of Financial Liberalisation: Lessons 
from the Polish Experience”, in: E. Colombo and J. Driffill (eds.), The Role of Financial Markets 
in the Transition Process, Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 13-42. 
Fazarri, S., R. Hubbard, B. Petersen, Blinder, A., and Poterba, J., 1988, “Financing 
constraints and corporate investment,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp141-206. 
Fazarri, S., R. Hubbard, B. Petersen, 2000, “Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities are 
Useful: A Comment on Kaplan and Zingales”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, pp. 695-
705. 
Galindo, A. and A. Schiantarelli, 2002, “Credit Constraints in Latin America: An 
Overview of the Micro Evidence”, Boston College, Working Paper, No. 537. 
Gertler, M., and Gilchrist, S., 1994, “Monetary Policy, business cycles and the behaviour 
of small manufacturing firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 4, pp309-340.   31
Filatotchev, I. and T. Mickiewicz, 2001, “Ownership Concentration, ‘Private Benefits of 
Control’ and Debt Financing”, Centre for the Study of Economic and Social Change in Europe, 
UCL, Working Paper No. 4. 
Gill, J. (2002) Bayesian Methods: A Social and Behavioral Sciences Approach. Chapman 
& Hall /CRC. 
Gilks, W.R., Richardson, S., Spiegelhalter, D. (1996) Introducing Markov chain Monte 
Carlo. In Markov Chain Monte Carlo in Practice (eds W.R. Gilks, S. Richardson, D. 
Spiegelhalter). London: Chapman & Hall. 
Glaeser, E., S. Johnson and A. Shleifer, 2001, “Coase versus the Coasians”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 116, 3, 853-899. 
Hall, B., Mairesse, J., Branstetter, L., and Crepon, B., 1998, “Does cash flow cause 
investment and R&D: an exploration using panel data for French, Japanese and US scientific 
firms,” Mimeo, Nuffield College, Oxford, UC Berkley, IFS and NBER. 
Harrison, A. and M. McMillan, 2003, “Does direct foreign investment affect domestic 
credit constraints?”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 61, pp. 73-100. 
Havrylyshyn, O. and R. van Rooden, 2003, “Institutions Matter in Transition, but so Do 
Policies”, Comparative Economic Studies, 45, 1, 2-24. 
Hines, J. and R. Thaler, 1995, “Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 9, 4, pp. 217-226. 
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A., and Scharfstein, D., 1991, “Corporate structure, liquidity and 
investment: evidence from Japanese Industrial groups,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 
106, 1, pp33-60. 
Hu, X., and Schiantarelli, F., 1994, “Investment and financing constraints: a switching 
regression approach using US firm level panel data,” Boston College, Working Paper No. 284. 
Hubbard, R., 1998, “Capital Market Imperfections and Investment”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol. 36, pp.193-225. 
Jarvis, R., 2000, “Finance and the Small Firm. In Enterprise and Small Business: 
Principles, Practice and Policy”, In: S. Carter and D. Jones-Evans (eds). Enterprise and Small 
Business: Principles, Practice and Policy, Prentice Hall, Harlow. 
Jensen, M., 1986, “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers,” 
American Economic Review,76, pp323-329. 
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Cost and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. 
Kaplan, S., and Zingales, L., 1997, “Do financing constraints explain why investment is 
correlated with cash flow?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, pp169-215. 
Kaplan, S., and Zingales, L., 2000, “Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities are Not Valid 
Measures of Financing Constraints”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, pp. 707-712. 
Keasey, K. and Watson, R., 1993, Small Firm Management, Ownership, Finance and 
Performance, Blackwell, Oxford. 
Kornai, J. 1986, “Hard and Soft Budget Constraint”, in: J. Kornai, Contradictions and 
Dilemmas. Studies on the Socialist Economy and Society, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 33-51. 
Kornai, J., 2001, “Hardening the Budget Constraint. The Experience of the Post-socialist 
Countries”, European Economic Review, 45, 1573-1599. 
Kozarzewski, Piotr, 2002, “Changes in Corporate Governance Structures in Polish 
Privatised Companies – Early Results from a Survey”, In: K. Liuhto, Business in Poland, 
Lappeenranta: Lappeenranta University of Technology, 176-210.   32
Lizal, L., and Svenjar, J., 2002, “Investment, credit rationing and the soft budget 
constraint: evidence from Czech Panel data,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 2, 
pp353-370. 
McKinnon, R., 1993, The Order of Economic Liberalisation. Financial Control in the 
Transition to a Market Economy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Major, I., 2003, “Privatisation in Hungary and Its Aftermath”, in: D. Parker and D. Saal 
(eds.), International Handbook on Privatisation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 427-453.  
McCullagh, P. (1980) Regression Models for Ordinal Data. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society. Series B, 42 (2), 109-42. 
Merton, R. C., 1974, “On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest 
Rates”, Journal of Finance, 29 (2), 449-70.  
 Mickiewicz, T. and M. Baltowski, 2003, “All Roads Lead to Outside Ownership: Polish 
Piecemeal Privatisation”, in: D. Parker and D. Saal (eds.), International Handbook on 
Privatisation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 402-426. 
Morck, R., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 1988, “Management Ownership and Market 
Valuation; An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-316. 
Myers, S. (1984) ‘The Capital Structure Puzzle’, Journal of Finance, 39, 575-92. 
Schiantarelli, F., 1996, “Financial constraints and investment: methodological issues and 
international evidence,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 12, 2, pp70-89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   33
Table 1. Description of variables 
Variable Explanation 
 Financial  variables: 
SALE_2000  Sale revenue in US$ million in 2000 
EBT_SALE_2000  Earnings before taxes (‘gross profit’) dived by sale revenue, in percentages, 
in 2000 
EBT_SALE_(AVER)  Earnings before taxes (‘gross profit’) dived by sale revenue, in percentages, 
1998-2000 average 
ASSET_SIZE_2000  Total assets measured in US$ million in 2000 
ASSET_SIZE_2000_SQ  Total assets measured in US$ million in 2000, squared 
DEBT_2000  debt to total assets ratio calculated as (assets minus equity)/assets, in 2000
POSDIV_2000  positive dividend payments in 2000, dummy variable 
EMPLOYMENT_2000  employment, as of 31 December 2000 
  Corporate control variables: 
LSP  Percentage of of shares of held by the largest shareholder 
DINS  largest shareholder = domestic institutional investor (industrial company or 
financial institution), a dummy variable 
FINS  largest shareholder = foreign investor 
IND  largest shareholder = individuals (outsiders and insiders) 
LEADBANK  one or two leading banks, a dummy variable 
FOREIGN  presence of foreign investor 
 Industry  dummies: 
IHEAV  heavy industry (ISIC: <14 and 27) 
ILAB  labour intensive industry (ISIC: 15-20 and 36) 
IRES  resource intensive industry (ISIC: 21-26) 
ITECH  medium and high technology industry (ISIC: 28-35) 
ISERVICES  services and construction (ISIC: 45, 50-52, >55) 
  Importance of a source of finance (Likert scale, 1-7; 7 – high importance) 
FINSALE  sale of assets 
FINSHR  sale of shareholdings in other companies 
FINRET retained  earnings 
FINCRED  credit – domestic 
FINFOR  credit – foreign 
FININD  credit from industrial partners 
FINSTRAT state  support 
FINEQ  issue of equity 
FINBOND  issue of bonds 
  Measures of financial constraints: 
IVT  desired level of modernisation investment expenditure over 5y 
RIVT  expected (realistic) level of modernisation investment expenditure over 5y 
UNC_FIN equals:   
0 if ivt>rivt, and 
1 if ivt=rivt (unconstrained access to finance) 
UN_FI_IN unconstrained  finance – indirect measure: 
0=firms, for which internal sources of finance (FINSALE, FINSHR, FINRET) 
and FINSTRAT are more important than external financing and they did not 
pay dividends (i.e. there was no information about dividend payments in 
2000) 
1=otherwise T
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